This article adduces evidence of the central role played by scientists in the 1970s and "lay persons" in the post-Chernobyl period in the production and legitimation of alternative types of knowledge and expertise on the environmental and health risks of nuclear energy in France. From a constructivist perspective, it argues that this shift in the relationship of "lay persons" to knowledge production is linked not only to the rise of mistrust vis-à-vis scientific institutions but also, and especially, to a change in the way they have reacted to "dependency" on institutions and to "state secrecy". Counterexpertise is constructed as a politics of surveillance where alternative interpretations of risk are buttressed by a permanent critique of the epistemic assumptions of institutional expertise. The identity of "counter-expert" is socially elaborated within this process.
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Introduction
Ulrich Beck developed his theory of "risk society", referring to "an epoch in which the dark sides of progress increasingly come to dominate social debate," shortly before the Chernobyl disaster (26 April 1986) . Since then, the biggest nuclear accident ever has added particular significance and publicity to Beck's analysis. It reinforced the concept of "reflexive modernization" which has the merit of stressing key social transformations in the relations between risk, nature, and society during recent decades.
This article focuses on one such transformation, through an analysis of the evolution of the place of science and expertise within the French nuclear protest movement from the 1970s until the 1990s. Interesting as they may be, a global discussion in terms of the changing categories of modernity in relation to nuclear energy (Beck 1994: 63-76) or a general analysis of the link between nuclear and modernity (Irwin et al. 2000) are outside the scope of this article. More specific, this article tackles the transformations associated with the production of alternative forms of scientific knowledge and expertise on nuclear risks. It discusses the central role played by scientists in the 1970s and "lay persons" 1 in the post-Chernobyl period, within this frame. In France, ever since the beginning of the nuclear industry, the capacities of expertise and know-how on nuclear energy have been mostly concentrated within two state organizations: CEA-the French Atomic Energy Commission founded in 1945 for the development of both military and civil applications of nuclear, and EDF-the national electricity supply company founded in 1946. The official bodies of regulation and control of nuclear power have been highly dependent on the expertise provided by these organizations-principal promoters of nuclear energy (Frost 1991; Hecht 1998; Restier-Melleray 1990) . Thus, since the middle of the 1970s, independent monitoring of nuclear energy has been taken on, for the most part, by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This phenomenon represents a specific social movement within environmental activism. I will qualify it as the "counter-expertise movement." 2 With the ambition to exercise an external control on the nuclear industry by employing science and developing expertise on the risk issues, the counter-expertise movement has participated in the establishment of a "countervailing power" 3 in the French nuclear domain. The Chernobyl accident has been a turning point for the movement in that the nuclear risks and the official "secrecy" associated with their management have been judged to be an explosive problem, and new forms of knowledge on the risks of radioactivity have emerged through the involvement of a number of "lay persons".
This article covers two periods that have been crucial for the critique of the environmental and health risks associated with nuclear power in that they provoked the creation of three major NGOs producing counter-knowledge and competencies: GSIEN (Group of Scientists for Information on Nuclear Energy) in the post-1968 period; and ACRO (Association for the Control of Radioactivity in the West), and CRIIRAD (Commission of Independent Information and Research on Radioactivity) in the post-Chernobyl period. 4 This article is based on thirty interviews conducted mostly with the major actors of the three associations as well as a systematic review of their archival documents and publications.
In line with Beck's analysis, we will see that the evolution of the counter-expertise movement on environmental and health risks associated with nuclear industry in France is emblematic of the increasing role played by science in the "capital of legitimation" (Beck 2003: 438-43 ) and the forms of action created by the critical actors in a domain-nuclear-where activism and critique have confronted a significant centralization of expertise by the state. More important, however, is the fact that, thanks to a perspective more cultural and constructivist 5 than Beck's 6 , we will observe the elaboration of counter-expertise as a social process and a "cognitive politics" redefining the dominant categories of institutional science and expertise. The rise of mistrust vis-à-vis science as an institution is central in both of the periods discussed. What changes from the 1970s to the 1990s is rather the manner in which "lay-persons" have dealt with the question of dependency on institutions. Unlike in the 1970s, in the period following the Chernobyl accident, the major issue for certain protest groups and ordinary citizens was not to rely on "good" experts or "good" scientists but to invent alternative forms of science and expertise, as well as more thorough conceptions of risk, which are directly attributable to a critique of the epistemic assumptions of institutional expertise (Wynne 1996a) . The identity of "counter-expert," which should be considered as a category of actor rather than a category of analysis, is constructed within this process.
The Origins of the Rise of a Counter-Expertise (1970s)
Since the 1970s, the demands for the protection of the environment have been closely linked to a critique of scientific and technological developments. At the same time, paradoxically, the recourse to science and expertise has become incrementally more important in the efforts to incorporate environmental problems in public policies (Lascoumes 1994; Yearley 1991) .
In France the nuclear protest movement emerged in association with the rise of the ecological critiques at the end of the 1960s and, initially, it was led by journalists, intellectuals, and a number of scientists (Garraud 1979) . Although, in its primary phase, the nuclear protest movement not only targeted nuclear energy but also aimed to transform an ecological ideology into a real social struggle, the harnessing of science and expertise for the denunciation of nuclear risks was, from the outset, an important element for the activists. Soon after its crea-tion in The Hague in 1972, the Committee Against Atomic Pollution, then one of the most important local groups in Nord-Cotentin, began to measure radioactivity around The Hague nuclear waste reprocessing plant, using a radiometer. In 1970, the journal Charlie Hebdo denounced the existence of a high level of radioactive pollution around the nuclear complex in Marcoule. Among the most spectacular whistle-blowing cases during this period was the one launched in 1972 by Survivre et Vivre (Survive and Live), an ecological group set up by mathematicians, who revealed numerous cracks in radioactive waste barrels stored at Saclay.
A significant ability to adduce technical arguments on risk issues was thus acquired, giving impetus to the movement. After the launch of a massive nuclear program by the French government in 1974, this work was to be intensified, and then formalized, by the creation of GSIEN, the first public-interest science group on nuclear energy in France. The fact that GSIEN developed its action by assembling knowledge on nuclear risks, with the aim of countering the official discourse, could allow us to consider it a pioneer actor in counter-expertise vis-à-vis nuclear power. Nevertheless, rather than employing the notion of counter-expertise as a category of analysis and labeling the actors as "counter-experts" a priori, let us observe the way in which this notion was received by the actors themselves. It is possible to detect, in this manner, the progressive adoption of the role of counter-expert by the actors from the 1980s on.
The Mobilization of Scientists as a Motor of the Development of a Counter-Expertise
GSIEN is in effect the product of a massive mobilization in the scientific community, which emerged after the launch of the government's "all nuclear" program, the so-called Messmer Plan, in 1974. The Plan entailed the installation of 170 reactors based on the light water system (known as the American system), distributed over 40 sites, which would increase the proportion of electricity generated from nuclear energy to 85 percent by 2000. This ambitious nuclear program, adopted in reaction to the petroleum crisis, was promoted as the only solution that could assure the independence of France in the energy sector.
In response to the Messmer Plan, reactions intensified in almost every social group. The trade union CFDT (French Democratic Confederation of Labor) took up an official position against the program.
Several environmental associations such as the French Federation of Societies for the Protection of Nature launched petitions demanding the abandonment of the program. As they became directly affected by the construction of the stations, local communities joined the movement, especially in Nord-Cotentin, Gironde, and Brittany. "A power station means death," "Reactive today or radioactive tomorrow" were among the most widely used slogans of the time (Touraine et al. 1983) .
With regard to the scientific community, the first series of reactions arose at the French Scientific Research Center (CNRS). A polemic began, especially among the members of the Nuclear and Particle Physics Commission (Commission 06) of CNRS, when the government asked a group of physicists belonging to this commission to prepare a report on the program. The so-called Klapisch-Ripka report, presented in April 1974, praised the program and, in particular, its cost-effectiveness was much vaunted. It also affirmed that the problems of nuclear energy, such as the risk of an accident, were under control. However, a group of young physicists, most of whom had permanent jobs at the CNRS, were quite critical of the Klapisch-Ripka report, which they judged as being "very optimistic and biased." 7 They notably refused to deliver, via this report, the scientific support demanded by the government and to serve the pouvoir (establishment). About 30 CNRS physicists from prestigious institutions such as Collège de France, Ecole Polytechnique, and Faculté d'Orsay mobilized in February 1975 to express their opposition to the nuclear program by means of a petition, the so-called Appeal of the 400.
Most of the researchers who launched the Appeal of 400 had taken an active part during the May 1968 movement. In parallel with the massive student movement, the rise of the intellectual critique (Foucault, Habermas, Ellul, Illich) of the power of technology, and the critique of trade unions (especially CFDT) of capitalism and "progress," the scientific community was also politicized during this period. Researchers massively denounced capitalist exploitation and social hierarchies in the laboratories and questioned the social function of science with regard to the Vietnam War, ecological threats, and industrial development. However, until the announcement of the Messmer Plan, apart from some distinguished scientists (such as the biologist Jean Rostand) and the mathematicians within Survivre et Vivre who had developed a combined critique of science and the ecological crisis, the scientific community in general and the community of physicists in particular had mostly stayed away from the antinuclear movement.
Indeed, it was not obvious within the scientific community in the 1970s that scientists should oppose nuclear power as a technology, especially in France. Young physicists who followed the generation of distinguished physicists (Joliot, Perrin, Leprince-Ringuet) were, despite the political-generational conflict that set them against their predecessors, attached to the promises regarding the pacific uses of nuclear energy.
Hence, in 1975, the Appeal of the 400 did not adopt a clear position against nuclear energy. It was mainly directed against the government's "all nuclear" policy. It pointed out the accident risks and the waste problem and claimed that nuclear power could not ensure the energy independence of France because of the limited character of the national uranium resources. It reacted, more generally, to the state expertise on nuclear energy and, in particular, attacked CEA for being "judge and jury" in its own case, because the control of the program was vested in this body. However, the appeal made no reference to the antinuclear protest that had already existed for at least five years. It thus gave the impression that the scientists were the first to denounce the nuclear risks.
The scientists' petition attracted a lot of media attention, both national and international. The appeal was signed, within a few weeks, by 400 researchers and, within three months, by about 4,000 researchers belonging to diverse disciplines such as physics (32%), biology (15%), nuclear physics (13%), chemistry (13%), and mathematics (10%).
Contesting Expertise by Information: The Case of GSIEN
At the end of 1975, as an extension of the Appeal of the 400, a group of the mobilized physicists decided to continue their action by founding GSIEN. The major aim behind the creation of GSIEN was the dissemination of "objective" information on nuclear power as against official information judged to be "biased".
GSIEN brought together nuclear physicists and high energy physicists from prestigious institutions such as CNRS, Collège de France, and the Nuclear Physics Institute of Orsay. This scientific elite had mainly left wing tendencies and was close to the political line of the then active Unified Socialist Party. The founders of GSIEN were inspired by the Union of Concerned Scientists, created in 1969 by several faculty members of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in reaction to the Vietnam War and, more specifically, the U.S. government's "misuse" of science. GSIEN was strongly supported by several CEA and EDF researchers and engineers who were members of CFDT. During this period CFDT, without being antinuclear, opposed the government's program, marshalling a critique of technocracy and authoritarianism. It provided a genuine source of information and counter-expertise on nuclear energy and had a significant influence on the information assembled by GSIEN (CFDT 1980) . Through critical analysis of official reports and exploration of academic and international literature on nuclear energy, GSIEN developed technical counterarguments in aid of the nuclear protest movement in its journal La Gazette Nucléaire. Contradicting the official argument on the safety of the power stations whereby EDF gave assurances that a nuclear accident would not kill anybody, GSIEN indicated that in the event of an accident, a nuclear power station would contain a level of radioactivity a thousand times greater than that released by an atomic bomb and a reprocessing plant would be ten thousand times more. Relying on several British and German reports, GSIEN (1977) claimed a range of 11 to 3,500 deaths in case of an accident. Concerning the waste problem, whereas EDF presented the vitrification and the burial of high activity wastes as the optimal solution, GSIEN insisted that it was impossible to extrapolate the laboratory analysis to real-life implementation in relation to, for instance, the reliability of vitrification. As to the low dose radioactivity, GSIEN members had little competency at the beginning and mostly referred to Anglo-Saxon studies. The studies conducted by the epidemiologist Alice Stewart (as well as Thomas Mancuso and George Kneale) on the cancer mortalities among the people who had worked in the Hanford nuclear power plant between 1944 and 1977 further fueled the debate in France.
"Neither Specialists Nor Experts"
Initially, at least, GSIEN members refused to identify themselves as "specialists," "experts," or "counter-experts." They characterized their action as rather that of "citizens" who did not have a competence on the nuclear program but who had the capacity to read and interpret scientific and technical documents by virtue of their profession as scientists. Since the exercise of expertise on nuclear power was mainly reserved for polytechnicians-the engineers and technicians of EDF and CEA-rejection of the role of expert by the scientists was a political strategy which aimed to denounce expertise on nuclear energy as serving the interests of the political establishment. The scientists of GSIEN preferred to act as an intermediary between the official scientific discourse and the antinuclear discourse-between insiders and challengers-in order to politicize expertise on nuclear energy. However, as a sign that they retained their cultural identity as scientists, 8 the members of GSIEN adopted a discourse of objectivity, "classic ideal of science", as Porter (1995) suggests, providing it with an impersonal, universal character and thus reinforcing its authority. GSIEN therefore judged it necessary to distance itself from polemics, scandals, and local protests. It was also reluctant to take an active part in juridical processes opposing the installation of power stations. As they have reported during our interviews, the scientists would prefer to conduct their action "for" the people and not "with" them. 9 In that sense, GSIEN confronted the contradictions associated with the tension between politicizing science and legitimating it vis-à-vis the official authorities.
Confronted by the rigidity of the EDF management and the effectiveness of the official expert spokespersons, who had influence in the juridical arena and on the media, the French antinuclear movement, despite being very massive between 1973 and 1977, could not prevent the installation of the power stations (except the one programmed in Plogoff). With the fading of the antinuclear movement at the end of the 1970s, activism also began to weaken among the GSIEN members. At the beginning of the 1980s, the most recent hopes pinned on the socialists for the re-evaluation of the nuclear choice after the Three Mile Island Accident were also dashed when the Mitterrand government reneged on its pre-election promises (e.g. cancellation of foreign contracts in the Hague reprocessing center, moratorium on the construction of the fastbreeder Superphénix, abandonment of all projects related to the construction of new power plants). Nevertheless, by bringing scientific support to the movement, GSIEN contributed to the demystification of the official certainties on nuclear risks and helped to partially destabilize the hegemony of official expertise. At the end of the 1970s, new information bodies such as Local Information Commissions and the Information Council on Nuclear Energy were created. A few enlarged expert committees, such as the Castaing Commission on waste management, were also established. GSIEN members were invited to these bodies although their participation was attributable to their institutional identity of "researcher."
Having no more than 50 active members at the beginning of the 1980s, GSIEN's action was reoriented from information on the nuclear program to monitoring of the local problems after the installation of around 20 new power stations provoked local controversies, in particular on waste storage and the routine releases of the power stations into the environment. Within this new debate, GSIEN members gradually assumed their role as counter-experts, although the counter-expertise function of GSIEN was only partly accepted by the authorities. Unlike the Union of Concerned Scientists, which rapidly expanded its action, with more than 4,000 members and 13 employees by 1979 (Balogh 1991: 274) , GSIEN neither insisted on promoting more membership nor aimed at becoming a professional think tank. None of the GSIEN members gave up their positions as public researchers in order to devote themselves to full-time professional activism. Their activity, conducted on a fragile basis with little financial means, was therefore far from providing a real capacity of counter-expertise in the governance of nuclear energy. The Chernobyl accident would become a turning point for what concerns counter-expertise on the sanitary and environmental effects of radioactivity in France.
The Post-Chernobyl Period: The Birth of "Independent" Radioactivity Laboratories
In France, more so than anywhere else in Europe, the management of the fallout from the Chernobyl accident created a real polemic and a never-ending controversy. After the accident, a special service of the ministry of health, the SCPRI (Central Service for Protection Against Ionising Radiation, created in 1956) was in charge of informing the public of the possible contamination in the French territory and of determining the appropriate measures to undertake. Unlike the expert bodies of the neighboring countries (Liberatore 1999) , SCPRI adopted a language of certainty on the absence of risks and rejected any protective measures whereas the public authorities, politicians, and the scientific community (except for two laboratories in Strasbourg and in Montrouge) refrained from intervening on the issue. The French media, too, stayed silent and displayed almost no skepticism vis-à-vis the official information during the first two weeks after the accident. All these factors impelled several citizen groups to accuse authorities of having promulgated a "state lie." Indeed, these groups judged that "state secrecy" on nuclear energy was the fundamental problem, far beyond nuclear power as a risky technology.
As far as the GSIEN members were concerned, they believed that in the French territory, the fallout from the accident was not "dra-matic" but that it was necessary to inform the public. 10 Having battled for many years for the re-evaluation of the nuclear choice because of the risks it embodied, the critique of GSIEN globally targeted the national nuclear program itself. GSIEN insisted on the safety aspects and the possibility of a future accident in France and opposed the official discourse, according to which such an accident (occurring on a Soviettype reactor) was impossible in European power stations.
However, the perception of risks for a group of people outside the scientific community was based on more immediate aspects. Mothers, especially, were concerned with the effects of low dose radioactivity, as they were mostly worried about what their children risked by consuming foodstuffs in the days following the accident. Yet some scientists, though critical of nuclear energy, only began to take seriously the risks associated with the Chernobyl cloud after they had been contacted by "lay-persons" asking them to analyze samples (grass, soil, and mushrooms) from their gardens. That was, for instance, the case for Robert Béraud, a nuclear physicist and a GSIEN member in the 1970s, who agreed to help Michèle Rivasi (then a biology teacher) and François Mosnier (an airline pilot), the future founders of CRI-IRAD, by analyzing their samples in his own laboratory in Lyon.
11 The analyses of Mr. Béraud revealed that the samples were all contaminated with Iodine 131, Caesium 134 and 137 as well as some other radiolements (Ruthenium 103 and 106, Tellurium 13) released by the Chernobyl reactor.
Such a difference in the concern for risks by the scientists who tended to evaluate the problem at a global level on one hand, and the non-specialists who suspected a risk at a local ("my garden"), personal ("my children"), and a practical ("can I consume?") level on the other hand, spurred several inhabitants to mobilize simultaneously. Paine (1992) similarly demonstrated the divergence in the nature of knowledge claims on risks concerning the fallout from the Chernobyl accident in the Norwegian context, between scientists and Saami pastoralists. Such divergence can be related to the socio-cultural dimension of knowledge on the uncertainty of risks. Unlike the GSIEN scientists, several inhabitants in two of the most nuclearized regions of France took seriously the fact that the fallout from the accident could be significant because they judged that state secrecy on nuclear affairs was a real problem. This served indeed as a milestone in the emergence of new forms of counter-expertise on nuclear energy in France. Two new NGOs were founded during the summer of 1986: ACRO in Normandy, and CRIIRAD in Rhones-Alpes.
Both CRIIRAD and ACRO were created by a majority of "lay-persons" (teachers, nurses, doctors, pilots, farmers, shopkeepers), aided by scientists (biologists and physicists) and technicians (ex-CEA workers, especially in the case of ACRO). Hence, unlike GSIEN in the 1970s, in the case of ACRO and CRIIRAD, scientists were no longer central to the claim for a counter-competence on nuclear risks.
"Apolitical Politics": Counter-Expertise as a Means of Reversing the Roles of "Expert" and "Lay Person"
Recent studies in the sociology of science, medicine or urbanism have well shown the transformation of relations between specialists and nonspecialists in cases where the capacity of "lay" knowledge and experience has been significant in the orientation and control of science (Callon et al. 2001; Epstein 1995; Wynne 1996a ). In the case of both ACRO and CRIIRAD, the "lay persons" aimed to reverse the roles attributed to experts and non-specialists and to denounce the "incompetence" of official experts who were considered as lay in the evaluation of radioactive contamination in localized areas. Hence both associations adopted tools and discourses that could allow them to act at the same level as experts. Consequently they oriented themselves towards a professionalization to a greater extent than GSIEN did in the 1970s.
The most significant of these tools was linked to the decision of both associations to establish a laboratory in order to produce "independent" expertise on radioactivity and its effects. My field research allows me to affirm that there was not much influence of one association on the other for this decision.
The founding of an NGO laboratory had several implications. For both ACRO and CRIIRAD, a laboratory was a means of ending the dependence on institutions and gaining autonomy for radioactivity measurements. It was an instrument for researching a truth other than the official facts and secrets in a context in which the whole (French) territory and the whole society had become a "laboratory", in Beck's terms (1994: 108) , for measuring the impact of the accident. A laboratory was also an indicator of legitimacy, a symbol of an equality of means ("big means against big means") in order to claim the right to participate in the management of risks. CRIIRAD claimed during its early years that the equipment in its laboratory, namely the gamma spectrometer that it had acquired, was much more precise and accurate than the SCPRI instruments. Finally, a laboratory was a means of becoming financially independent, by charging for analyses ordered by individuals, environmental groups, or local authorities.
Both ACRO and CRIIRAD identified themselves as "apolitical" and "independent," refusing any attachment to political parties, activist groups, institutional bodies, or industrial groups. Being identified apolitical was a way to achieve credibility in dealing with a political problem that was negotiated in technical terms.
Currently, CRIIRAD has 13 employees and more than 5,000 members while ACRO has 6 employees and around 250 members. In both cases, mostly scientists and technicians do the laboratory work while voluntary members contribute to the field sampling. This situation differs from the initial one where non-specialists had an opportunity to learn laboratory measurements as well. The employees of both associations are highly specialized in one aspect of the problem (either effects of low doses or waste management or radon measurements, for example), as in official bodies. Furthermore, both associations have assigned themselves the mission of educating the public on the risks of nuclear energy and both organize training sessions on matters such as the measurement of radioactivity with a Geiger counter. The reversal of the roles of "experts" and "lay-persons" by the construction of a counter-expertise thus creates new frontiers, between counter-experts and non-specialists.
Counter-Expertise as "Power of Surveillance"
Through the concept of "counter-democracy," the French historian Pierre Rosenvallon has argued that mistrust vis-à-vis science in particular, and modern democracy and politics in general, should be considered to be a new distinct form of politics today. "Counterdemocracy" does not signify the contrary of democracy but rather a system where various forms of power are challenged by a "power of surveillance" that the society practices through acts of vigilance, denunciation, and technical evaluation (Rosenvallon 2006: 35-79) . The cases of ACRO and CRIIRAD illustrate the way in which the question of surveillance has become central in the post-Chernobyl period. Indeed, since the Chernobyl "scandal," the rise of mistrust in the authorities as well as of the social awareness on official "secrecy" provoked a radical shift in the manner of framing criticism of nuclear energy and its risks.
Some of the ACRO founders were antinuclear activists in the 1970s. In 1986 they were convinced that opposing nuclear power was not effective anymore, and that in order to make some impact on the nuclear industry, it was essential to develop capacities of expertise. 12 Similarly, for CRIIRAD, a laboratory was the best way to concretize action and to gather as much public support as possible in a decade when the ecological movement and political activism had been weakened. "The public didn't want any more demagogy on nuclear so we wanted to show that their support was for concrete action" was, for instance, the conviction of one of the founders of CRIIRAD.
13 "Demagogy" meant opposing nuclear, "which didn't work." Concrete action meant searching for a change, an improvement in the control of nuclear industry. This situation illustrates the capacity of and the need felt by critical actors to be complementary in the management of risks when the channels for a democratic re-evaluation of technological choices seem closed.
Since 1986, the expert activism practiced by ACRO and CRIIRAD has helped develop a new type of actor, the whistle-blower. Thanks to the analyses of the laboratories of ACRO and CRIIRAD, in the media arena, local controversies have much increased since the beginning of the 1990s. Instead of contesting and denouncing with spectacular campaigns, a more constructive, concrete, and expert strategy is preferred, not only by the organizations of counter-expertise like CRIIRAD and ACRO but also by several antinuclear groups such as Greenpeace, although they remain protestors. In return, the authorities have revised their information strategies and announce, for instance, technical hitches in the nuclear park through online servers. Regulations have also been tightened up, in particular with regard to the authorization of releases in The Hague region, where ACRO has continued to take measurements since its creation. Since the emergence of a big controversy on the possible rise of leukemia cases among the children living near The Hague nuclear waste reprocessing center in 1996, the government services in charge of the control of nuclear activities have also advocated more dialogue with the public. The Institute for Nuclear Security and Protection (IPSN), founded as a service within CEA in 1976, organized a pluralist expert committee for the evaluation of the polemic on child leukemia to which ACRO members were invited. Predominately, the measurements of ACRO in The Hague region have served as the most detailed data for pollution analysis even if the committee was, in the end, unable to judge the existence of a cause-effect relation.
CONFRONTING NUCLEAR RISKS
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The Chernobyl Affair: Beyond the Battle on Becquerels
Although involved in many local controversies concerned with the pollution issuing from power stations, reprocessing centers, uranium mining, or former radium sites, CRIIRAD did not abandon the Chernobyl affair, which was its raison d'être. The association managed to maintain the debate on the Chernobyl controversy by carrying out numerous analyses in 165 French communes during its first seven years of existence. Reacting against the official discourse that continued to refer to the measurements of SCPRI dating back to 1986, geologist André Paris collaborated with CRIIRAD in drawing up a map of the contamination of France due to the fallout from the Chernobyl cloud. André Paris devoted three years of his life (1999) (2000) (2001) to walking thousands of kilometers around France as well as many other European countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia) with a spectrometer, on a voluntary basis.
With the publication of the map of the contamination of France in 2001, CRIIRAD claimed that the contamination by Caesium 137 (the radioelement that was systematically detected during the field analysis) was at an average level of 6,600 Becquerel/m2 for the AlsaceLorraine region, a level more than 800 times greater than the one announced by SCPRI in May 1986. CRIIRAD also affirmed that one-fifth of the sites in Alsace was contaminated beyond 10,000 Becquerel/ m2, a threshold level by which the European Union has determined the highest contamination zones in Western Europe. For Corsica, the region where no check on vegetables was conducted by SCPRI until June 1986, CRIIRAD's measurements were revealed to be even more significant, with an average of 9,720 Becquerel/m2, going beyond 30,000 in certain zones, while the average for Provence-Alpes-Côtes d'Azur appeared to be 15,000 (CRIIRAD and Paris 2002) .
Just after the drawing up of the map, CRIIRAD and the French Association of Thyroid Patients (AFMT), created in 1999, lodged a complaint against the State concerning the management of the impact of the Chernobyl accident in France. Around 550 thyroid patients currently claim their right to be recognized as "victims," as they relate their diseases to the radioactive fallout from the disaster. CRIIRAD's analyses serve as a scientific basis in the cause of these patients.
Nevertheless, the challenge to the authorities by CRIIRAD goes beyond a simple battle over measurements. It is also more than a search for justice by the revelation of the truth regarding the state experts who are accused of secrecy and neglect and of violating the European norms in 1986, in particular in connection with the importation of food from within and outside Europe.
CRIIRAD contests the methodology employed by the experts of SCPRI and asserts their "incompetence" in the measurement of radioactivity in the air and in depositions in the soil, in the analysis of the contamination of foodstuffs and in the evaluation of biological contamination. For instance, CRIIRAD has objected to the measurements of Iodine 131 in the air by SCPRI experts as the latter did not take into account the presence of Iodine in gas form which, representing around 70 percent of the total Iodine, cannot be captured either by paper filters or by desorption. Concerning the deposition of radioelements in the soil, CRIIRAD has accused SCPRI experts of having established average values from very few measurements (and sometimes even one, as in Alsace) and of thus having neglected the heterogeneity of radioactive contamination, which is highly dependent on different soil structures and the level of rainfall during the exposure to radiation (in Alsace, CRIIRAD detected a variation ratio of 1/30 in measurements taken in 66 regions). With regard to the official evaluation of the contamination of the food chain, CRIIRAD has condemned the SCPRI experts for having made their calculations on the contamination of one product each time (either milk or cheese) instead of considering all the components of a daily diet. In the view of CRIIRAD, in their measurements, the official experts also assumed that only one radioelement contaminated a foodstuff each time whereas in reality several of them were released after the accident and must have contaminated the food products. The association has insisted that SCPRI experts assumed that every French citizen had a standard diet and thus neglected the susceptibility of certain risk groups with specific diets (fetuses, infants, children, pregnant women as well as rural communities consuming higher levels of milk and meat products). Furthermore, concerning the evaluation of the biological contamination of human beings, CRIIRAD has reproached the SCPRI experts for having considered only the ingestion of Iodine 131 (through food) and for ignoring its inhalation due to the atmospheric contamination. Yet, CRIIRAD has argued, in order to judge the possible irradiation of the thyroid, SCPRI experts took into account only Iodine 131 whereas, in fact, Cesium 134 and 137 are also concentrated in the thyroid. On this controversial issue, CRIIRAD has relied on the studies of Youri Bandazhevsky, a Belarusian doctor who, within a study conducted on 52 children between 1996 and 1998, observed a concentration of Cesium 137 around 6.5 times more in the children's thyroid than in that of adults and has concluded that the thyroid gland is one of the organs that accumulates the highest amounts of Cesium (CRIIRAD and AFMT 2001) . To sum up, the evaluation of the risk due to the Chernobyl cloud by CRIIRAD has mainly been based on, and fueled by, a critique of the epistemic basis of official expertise, the cultural practices of scientists and the taken-for-granted and reductionist assumptions of official science.
Given the absence of epidemiological studies on thyroid patients in France, 14 the complaint lodged by CRIIRAD and the thyroid patients faces the difficulty of establishing a cause-effect relationship between the Chernobyl fallout and the development of thyroid diseases in a number of individuals. In this context, the counter-expertise provided by CRIIRAD does not claim to be a proof. It is rather a means of lobbying for the launch of epidemiological studies, for requestioning the bases on which scientific certainties are constructed, and for the revision of the social definition of the category of "proof" in uncertainty cases. Hence, counter-expertise serves as a politics challenging principal categories of science and of justice.
Conclusion
The history of the counter-expertise movement in France highlights the manner in which the prevailing boundaries between "experts" and "public" have been problematized by the elaboration of the category of "counter-expert." This category, refuted by "responsible scientists" in the 1970s who were then the legitimate spokespersons for the cognitive and scientific basis of the criticism on nuclear risks, was especially constructed by groups led by "lay persons" in the postChernobyl period. In this latter period, characterized by the rise of a politics of surveillance, scientific instrumentation was decisive for "lay persons" to gain autonomy vis-à-vis institutional dependency, to acquire legitimacy vis-à-vis official experts and the public and to contest the way in which official science defines meanings on public risk issues. Instead of claiming a "good" institutional expertise or "good" experts to deal with risks, critical actors elaborated their own means and competencies. The divergence in the determination of the salient dimensions of nuclear risks between scientists and "lay persons" played an important role in this orientation.
Rather than being considered as a decline in politics or in environmental activism, the counter-expertise movement in the French nuclear debate can be apprehended as a new cognitive politics. This politics attacks the apparently objective conceptions of risk via the production of alternative forms of knowledge about them. It suggests that public reactions to risk are not aimed at a predefined, one-dimensional risk "out there" but rather that they are directly based on a critique of the manner in which institutions interpret and conceive risks on behalf of the public (Wynne 1996a; . Consequently, the official truth claims are deconstructed and the interpretation of risk in domains laden with uncertainty, such as low dose radioactivity, is drawn out of its black box and is redefined on more elaborate assumptions and less homogenized worldviews.
These observations can be reframed, however, in more global terms via two concluding remarks.
My first remark is related to the national and cultural specificities of the counter-expertise movement analyzed in this article. In the French context, where nuclear energy is a significant element of national identity and pride (Hecht 1998) , the fact that the political opportunity structures have been much restricted for the antinuclear activists since the 1970s (Kitschelt 1986 ) has led to an increasing search for forms of legitimate action based on scientific rationalism. Nevertheless, the development of capacities for counter-expertise within the nuclear protest movement is far from being a French exception. In Germany, organizations such as Öko-Institut created in 1977, Gruppe Ökologie: Institut für ökologische Forschung und Bildung founded in 1981, or UmweltInstitut München established in 1986 just after the Chernobyl accident, all developed technical competencies. Öko-Institut, for example, rapidly diversified its fields of activity (beyond nuclear), lobbied in favor of alternative energy sources and managed to take part in the national energy debate whereas CRIIRAD and ACRO adopted a more defensive strategy vis-à-vis nuclear and chose to act on a more technical basis (Jacquiot 2000) . Despite its significance as a problem of democracy, the fact that the "nuclear secrecy" has largely framed the forms of collective action in France is also symptomatic of the specificities of the relations between science, politics, and society in this country where information is considered to be an inescapable element for the public to understand science and develop an enlightened opinion on it.
My second remark concerns the recent transformations within the French nuclear protest movement and the nuclear energy debate in general. During the 1990s, counter-experts and whistle-blowers did succeed in occupying the media arena by generating various controversies on technical risk issues whereas the frontiers between pronuclear and antinuclear positions did become blurred (Chateauraynaud and Torny 1999) . However, since the end of the 1990s, a return to radical contestation has taken place through the creation of Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire (RSN: Nuclear Phase-Out Network), an antinuclear network founded in 1998 with the aim of continuing the struggle that led to the abandonment of the fast-breeder Superphénix (1997). Currently, RSN federates around 800 NGOs, and local environmental groups and parties. Indeed, radical opposition to nuclear power became, once more, a key form of action at a time when the nuclear industry had become too powerful to be destabilized by technical controversies, affairs or scandals focused on risk issues. The major reason for this is attributable to the success of the recent discursive strategies promoting nuclear energy as an inevitable-even ecological-solution to the climate change problem and thus favoring "nuclear renaissance" in Europe and globally. Such rapid changes in the relationship between nuclear energy, environment, and society show that, in technoscientific domains where the balance of power between institutions and social movements remains highly asymmetrical, "cognitive politics" has its limits. It cannot serve as the dominant form of collective action for very long, just as "risk" cannot primarily determine the setting for debates, controversies and conflicts forever.
